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I. INTRODUCTION
This article presents a critique of chapter

1

of the Proposed

Restatement of Employment Law. The critique is organized to follow the
organization of the proposed Restatement, which begins with a provision of
black letter law, a series of comments and illustrations explaining the
meaning and application of the black letter law, and the reporters' notes
providing support for the black letter law and the commentary. This
critique will follow that structure, with each part focusing on a section of
the chapter: the introductory note; section
and section

1 .04.

1 .0 1 ;

section

1 .02;

section

1 .03;

The subdivisions of the parts will, likewise, generally

follow the subdivisions of the sections in the chapter, although sometimes a
critique of the reporters' notes will be its own subpart, and sometimes it
will be discussed in the subsections analyzing the comments.
II. INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A. Scope
The Proposed Restatement's Introductory Note alludes to the fact that
much of the law defining who is an employee consists of judicial and
administrative interpretations of various employment and labor relations
statutes. The Restatement should state specifically that these definitions can
vary from statute to statute, even when the interpretations claim to be
relying on common-law usage, and that statutory definitions may also vary
from the common law.

The definition of "employee," when used to define the coverage of a
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statute, might vary depending on the purpose of the legislation at issue. 1
The common-law definition thus makes more sense when used in wage and
hour laws than in civil rights legislation. We recognize, however, that in
certain instances, because of long-established judicial interpretations, any
major modification of the traditional distinction between "employee" and
"independent contractor" would probably require amendatory legislation.
More broadly, the Introductory Note should explain that employment
law has been in ferment during the last few decades, especially regarding
employment at will, and the Restatement's formulation of existing law
should

not

foreclose

desirable

future

common-law

or

statutory

developments.

B. Terminology
The

Introductory

Note

correctly

observes

that

the

purpose

of

"employment law" is to "set the rights and duties of the parties to the
employment relationship rather than to set the bounds of enterprise
2
vicarious liability to third parties." Later, the Reporters' Notes to section

1 .01

point out that the distinction between employees and independent

contractors originated in the "early, seminal English cases" designed to
"protect consumers or purchasers from vicarious liability for the acts of
3
service providers they could not control." The Note should emphasize at
the outset that this derivation of the definition of "employee" could lead to
an inappropriate

limitation

on the scope of the term in situations where the

very opposite - broad coverage - should be the goal, as in employee·

protection statutes and antidiscrimination legislation.
III. SECTION

1 .01 4

A. Text of the Provision and Critique
§

1.01 General Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship

(1) Unless otherwise provided by law or by §1.02 or §1.03, an
individual renders services as an employee of an employer if
(a) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of

I . See, e.g., D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 1 1 3 (N.J. 2007) (a worker who might
be classified as an independent contractor at common law may qualify as an employee under a
whistleblower statute).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, ch. I , at 1 -2 (Council Draft No. 3, 2008).
3. Id.§ I.OJ reporters' notes, cmt. a, at 1 9.
4. This critique of section 1 .0 1 was written by Theodore J. St. Antoine and Joseph E. Slater.
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the employer,
(b) the employer consents to receive the individual's services,
and
(c) the individual does not render the services as an independent
business.
(2) An individual renders service as an independent business
when the individual exercises entrepreneurial control over the
manner and means by which the services are performed in
order to serve his or her own interests.
(3) Entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by
which services are performed is control over important business
decisions, including whether to hire assistants and where to
assign them, whether to purchase and where to deploy
equipment, and whether to service other customers.
We are generally satisfied that the proposed black-letter language of
section

1 .01

effectively

captures

the

essence

of

the

employment

relationship as distinguished from that of an independent contractor
providing services to a consumer or other purchaser. Over time the courts
have used such tests as the "right to control" and the "economic reality of
dependence" to draw the distinction. Other industrialized societies have
applied similar tests to distinguish between an employee and one who
provides services as an independent business. But the United States appears
more reluctant than most countries to depart from common-law agency

principles and to adopt broadly an emphasis on statutory purposes. 5

B. Comments on Section
1.

1.01

-

Critique

Overview

In Comment a, the authors note that one of the common law tests for
the existence of an employment relationship, the right-to-control test, was
originally developed for the purpose of determining when it is appropriate
to hold a principal liable in respondeat superior for the torts of its agent. 6
In discussing the test, the authors describe sections

(Second) of Agency

and

7.07

of the

220 of the Restatement
Restatement (Third) of Agency. 7

However, those sections seem to serve quite different purposes. Section

220

reads like a true definitional provision, as its title, "Definition of

5. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of
Workers in Need ofProtection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 365-73 (2002).
6. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § I.OJ cmt. a.
7. Id.

CRITIQUE OF RESTATEMENT CHAPTER I

2009)

Servant," indicates. 8 Section
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in contrast, is entitled, "Employee

7 .07,

Acting Within Scope of Employment." 9 Comment f to section
refer to the factors cited in section

220

7.07

does

as a test for employment status,

including the degree of control the principal has over the methods the agent
applies to her work, whether the agent supplies her own tools and
materials, and whether the work the agent performs is customarily
performed under the supervision of the principal. 10 But Comment f to
section 7.07 is not cited in the text of Comment a to section 1 .01 of
Restatement (Third) ofEmployment Law. 1 1 To avoid confusion, Comment f
to section 7.07 should be cited there. What is significant is that section
7.07, like section 220 in actual effect, is meant to help determine when one
person is responsible, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the
acts of another person providing services to the former. Even though courts
have relied on these factors in determining who is an employee in other
contexts, this is not the best way to go about defining "employee" in any
general sense. The issue is sufficiently important to be treated directly. At
the very least, the

that section

of the

based to a

1 .01

Restatement should candidly acknowledge
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law is

considerable extent on the indirect treatment of employees and servants in
sections

7 .07

and

220

of the

Restatements (Third)

and

(Second) ofAgency,

respectively.
This of course reiterates the concern expressed earlier about an
excessively narrow definition of "employee" when used in certain worker
protection and antidiscrimination statutes. Even the Reporters' Notes
dealing with Comment a to section

1 .01

recognize that the precedent

making English cases developed the right-to-control test for the purpose of

protecting

consumers and purchasers from vicarious liability "for the acts

of service providers." 1 2 That seems quite contrary to the approach that
ought to be taken in considering the coverage of employee-protection
statutes.

2.
Illustration

16

Illustrations

to Comment f should be omitted. Comment f concerns

the requirement in any employment relationship that the employer consent

to receiving the employee's services. 13

Illustration

8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 220 ( 1 958).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 7.07 (2006).
10. Id. § 7.07 cmt. f.
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ I.OJ cmt. a.
1 2. Id.§ I.OJ reporters ' notes, cmt. a, at 1 9.
13. Id. § I.OJ cmt. f.

16

provides the
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example of a union "salt" situation, in an attempt to illustrate the point that
"[c]onsent is not negated by an employee's misrepresentations."14 It is
inappropriate to equate union salting with a "misrepresentation." First, in
the Illustration itself, the employees make no representation, let alone a
misrepresentation. They simply withhold from the employer the fact that
they are union organizers.15 Moreover, under Federal law, the employer
may not discriminate against them because of their status as union
organizers.16 The Supreme Court has held that union salts are employees
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act

(NLRA),

recognizing the statute's policy to protect union organizing from employer
interference. 17 Neither the Illustration nor the Reporters' Notes reflect that
point, which leaves the impression that seeking employment with a union
organizing objective is somehow improper. Such a notion is manifestly
incorrect.

C. Reporters' Notes - Critique
The Reporters' Notes to Comment a state that courts often use a multi
factor analysis to determine whether a person is an employee under
employee-protection statutes, including workers' compensation statutes
that originally relied on a "narrow, one factor right-to-control test."1 8
However, all of the cases cited in support of that proposition come from the
far western United States (Alaska, Arizona, California, etc.).19 To make
clear that this is not simply a regional aberration, it would be well to
substitute or add decisions from elsewhere.

20

14. Id. § I.OJ cmt. f. illus. 1 6.
1 5. Id.
16. 29 U.S. C. § 1 58(a)(3) (2000).
1 7. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 ( 1 995).
1 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § I.OJ reporters' notes cmt. a, at 22. The
authors cite ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ( 1 976) as general support for
the treatment of the issue in workers' compensation statutes. This reference should be replaced by
appropriate references to the current version, of the looseleaf treatise, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP.
LAW (MB). More than 340 libraries hold the latter; neither the University of Michigan's Law Library
nor any of its peers any longer carry the 1 976 edition (even its title- Workmen's Compensation -is an
anachronism). We would suggest citing Contractor Distinction: Relative Nature of Work, 3 LARSON'S
WORKERS' COMP. LAW 62. 1 ;62.2, § 62.01 (May 1 999) ("The modem tendency is to find employment
when the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the employer, and when the
worker, relative to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or professional service" and
"[T]he control test is in practice giving way to the relative-nature-of-the-work test . . . [The reasons
include] the logical irrelevance of the tort-connected test of control of the objectives of social legislation
generally"); § 62.06 (June 2007).
1 9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1 .0 1 , reporters' notes cmt. a, at 22.
20. For example, the authors could include Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas.,
16 S.W.3d 545, 547-48 (Ark. 2000) and Re/Max v. Wausau Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 1 54, 1 57 (N.J. 2000) as
central and eastern examples.
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The Reporters' Notes to Comment c assert that in the case of unskilled
workers, the multi-factor test used in determining who is an employee for
purposes of worker-protection laws, is often unnecessary because of the
close control typically exerted over such employees. 21
proposition, the authors cite

Secretary of Labor

v.

In support of the

Lauritzen. 22

However,

the notion that a multi-factor analysis is not necessary appears to be much
more the position of concurring Judge Easterbrook than that of the majority
in the Lauritzen case. 23 We recommend that the authors cite directly to the
concurring opinion to avoid suggesting that the majority holding supports
this proposition. In addition, although the notes assert that the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA), 24 was also at
issue in Lauritzen,25 we cannot find any reference to that statute in either
the trial or appellate decisions that are reported. The Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) seems the only statute involved. The MSAWPA is relied on, as
well as the FLSA, in a couple of the other decisions reported in this same
paragraph in Comment

c.

The Reporters' Notes to Comment d state that both the NLRA and the
Social Security Act were amended to exclude independent contractors from
the definition of "employee."26
While the notes are correct that the
language of the NLRA explicitly excludes independent contractors from

the definition,27 the Social Security Act currently defines an "employee" as
a person who would be considered an employee at common law.2 8 We
would infer from the context that the reference may be to an older version
of this section. If so, the text should say so and the citation should provide
the date.29

2 1 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 1 .0 I reporters' notes cmt. c, at 23.
22. Id. (citing Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1 529 (7th Cir. 1987)).
23. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1 539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1 823 (2000).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .0 1 reporters' notes cmt. c, at 23.
26. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .0 1 reporters' no!eS cmt. d.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1 52(3) (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 410(j) (2000).
29. The comments, illustrations, and reporters' notes also contain a number of typographical and
minor citation errors which the reporters will wish to correct in future drafts.
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IV. SECTION 1.0230

A . Text ofthe Provision and Critique
Section 1.02 Volunteers Are Not Employees for Purposes of Laws
Governing Employment Relationship.

Unless otherwise provided by law, for purposes
governing protections, benefits, and obligations
employment relationship, an individual is a volunteer
an employee if the individual renders uncoerced
without being offered a material inducement.

of laws
in the
and not
services

This default rule for interpreting the identified category of laws does
two things. First, it declares who the law should characterize as a volunteer.
Second, it declares what should be the consequence of that status with
respect to employment legislation.

B. Comments on Section

1.02 -

Critique

The rule's criteria for defining those excluded from the protections
and responsibilities of employment laws are discussed in Comments b, c, e,
1
and f which respectively are titled "material inducement,"3 "promises of
3
future material gain," 2 "volunteers perform uncoerced services,"33 and
"employer

pressure." 34

The

rule's

proclamation

that

volunteers

are

excluded from employment legislation is rationalized in Comment a, and
the purported support for that proposition is presented throughout the
Comments and Reporters' Notes.

1.

Comment a - Relevance of Agency Principles

Comment a contains two propositions. The first asserts that volunteers
are not treated as employees for purposes of laws governing employee
protections and obligations35 - an assertion that has no direct connection to
the comment's title. The sole rationale

offered in support

of that

proposition is that volunteers do not make the same commitment to an
employer as do employees and, therefore, are not treated as employees for

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Alvin Goldman authored the critiques of sections 1.02 through 1 .04.
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 cmt. b.
Id. cmt. c.
Id. cmt. e.
Id. cmt. f.
Id. cmt. a.
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the purposes of such protections and obligations.36 The logic of that
assertion has some cogency with respect to those laws whose protections
are based on long term commitments, such as pension benefits or family
and medical leave. However, there is a want of reasons to connect long
term commitment to other sorts of protections like those involving work
related exposure to injury or illness or protection from status discrimination
or from retaliation based on exercising significant legal privileges or
obligations including whistle-blowing.
Furthermore, the assumption underlying the rationale that long term
commitment

to the

employer

is an

appropriate

prerequisite to the

protections offered by employment laws is not self-evident. Except where
short term employees are expressly

excluded from certain statutory

regimes, the law does not exclude temporary or casual workers from
employee rights or obligations. 37 Moreover, the activities that most often
attract volunteers (distribution of food to the needy, assisting in hospitals,
nursing homes, and day care centers; leading youth organizations, teaching
religious school, surrogate sisters and brothers, building homes for the
underprivileged, charitable fund raising, and the like) typically do so
because of the volunteer's emotional or ideological dedication to the
enterprise mission. Volunteers, therefore, often take great pride in that
activity and their rigorous participation often persists for decades. The
Reporters offer no case decisions in support of the offered "commitment"
rationale for the declared rule, 38 and, as discussed below, a number of
decisions extend some employee protections to volunteers. 39
Comment a observes that, as stated in the

Agency,

Restatement (Third) of

beneficiaries of volunteer services can be held vicariously liable

for a volunteer's misconduct, 40

but it goes on to declare, without

explanation or cited authority, that suitability for such tort liability is not
determinative of employee status. Nevertheless, more careful analysis
suggests that the same reasons that justify holding a principal vicariously
liable for a volunteer's conduct may also justify construing some types of
employee protective laws to encompass some who perform services on

36. Id.
37. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (not defining employee by the duration of employment or
identity of employer for purposes of the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000) (excluding under the FLSA
public agency and non-profit food bank volunteers from definition of "employee," but not seasonal or
short term workers).
38. RESTAT EMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 reporters' notes cmt. a.
39. See Acts Outside Regular Duties, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 27.03(4)(b)
(June 2008).
40. RESTAT EMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.02 cmt. a (citing RESTAT EMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY§ 7.07(3)(b) (2006)).
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what ordinarily would be considered a volunteer basis. For example, the
principal ' s superior ability to prevent a mishap, or to spread the financial
burdens of unavoidable risks among those who benefit from the work,
justifies extending the protection of safety and health regulations and injury
and illness insurance benefits to all who perform the work regardless of
whether they are treated as employees for other purposes. Indeed, as
discussed below, some courts construe such legislation in this manner.
Accordingly, the Reporters have not provided support for the black letter
declaration of the stated default interpretive rule either in the form of clear
doctrinal analysis or a clear consensus of authority.
Of less importance, but worth noting, is an inconsistent use of
descriptive language in this portion of the Draft. Comment a characterizes
4
the recipient of volunteer services as an employer, 1 and later in the same
42
paragraph characterizes the recipient as a principal.
Because there is no
"employer" if the voluntary service does not result in an employment
relationship, the first term is inappropriate. The term "principal," indicating
an agency relationship, may be appropriate for third party claim purposes
but does not accurately depict a voluntary relationship for other purposes,
such as the obligations or privileges between the immediate parties. It is
suggested, therefore, that the phrase "beneficiary of the services" would be
a more neutral characterization for use throughout the paragraph.
Finally, Comment a uses the term "true volunteer" without defining it.
Are there "untrue" volunteers? If so, what is the significance of the true
volunteer status?

2.

Comment b - Material Inducement

Comment b expands on the black letter rule' s assertion that being
offered a material inducement removes one from the status of volunteer. It
explains that an "individual may be induced or motivated to work by the
promise of any type of material gain, whether in the form of monetary
compensation, some special benefit such as insurance, or an in-kind
4
payment." 3 Comment b, however, does not accurately reflect the full
scope of modem contract doctrine respecting consideration because it

41. The second sentence of comment a reads, "Individuals who render services to an entiry
without coercion and without material inducement have not been extended the same kind of
commitment from an employer as those who work for material gain," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAw § 1.02 cmt. a.
42. The last sentence of the first paragraph in comment a reads, "Volunteers, however, may have
certain protections from or obligations toward their principals that do not depend on employee status,"
Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 cmt. b.
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ignores consideration in the form of material gain to third persons or parties
to whom the individual has a legal obligation or emotional tie. 44
Additionally, it fails to recognize consideration in the form of a forbearance
or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relationship.45 No
explanation is given for using a more narrow concept of inducement for
employment contracts

than

for other contracts or

inconsistency between this and the

for creating this

Restatement (Third) of Contracts.

If the

Reporters intend the term "material inducement" to be as broad a concept
as that used in describing contractual enforceability, clarification would
best be accomplished if the black letter rule itself cross-referenced the
companion Restatement.
The broader

Restatement (Third) of Contracts

perspective of what

material inducement includes and thus who is an employee would, of
course, expand the scope of coverage of employee protective laws. The net
financial impact of a broadened or narrowed perception of employment is
not examined in the Comments. Absent such guidance for a policy choice
one might turn to the goal of equal justice. Under that standard is it not
doubtful whether the appropriate presumption is that the legislature would
favor placing greater risks and burdens on those who, without deriving
personal benefit from their work, perform the same services and generate
the same social or economic values as those whose work is remunerated?
The Reporters' Notes cite an article by Mitchell Rubinstein without
analysis or discussion. The article offers an additional reason for construing
employee protective statutes as covering volunteers:46
It is ... important to understand the legal rights of volunteers since there
is potential for abuse. Specifically, some volunteers may be exploited by
employers looking for a source of inexpensive - or worse, free - labor.
Given that this nation wants to, and needs to, encourage volunteerism, it
must curb the exploitation of volunteers. 47

Moreover,

the

Rubinstein

article

demonstrates

that

there

is

a

44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CO NTRAC TS§ 71 cmt. e. (1981).
45. Id. § 71(3); see also Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150 Cal. 1995) (worker's
compensation available to claimant who was injured while doing community service in lieu of being
subject to other penalties); Whitlock v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 377 P.2d 148 (Ore. 1962)
(building owner's workers' compensation insurance liable for the volunteer's claim where nonprofit
organization was paid to paint a building and volunteer suffered lead poisoning while doing that work).
The Reporters' Notes to Comment e cite Arriaga as an example of a coerced "volunteer. "
Although that element removed the worker from the status of "volunteer," the beneficiary government
agency's responsibility to provide workers' compensation benefits was still dependent on establishing
an employment relationship. That relationship was supported by the agency being a third party
beneficiary of the prosecutor's offer to do community service in lieu of a less desirable legal obligation.
46. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147 (2006).
47. Id. at 150-51.
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disconnect between the unsettled state of the case law on the subject and
the Reporters' unqualified black letter statement of section

1.02

respecting

the relationship between volunteer status and employment protections.48
The Reporters'

Notes assert that volunteers are not treated as

employees if they do not receive pay or significant benefits and cite three
cases in support of that proposition.

49

Those cases do not support that broad

proposition; rather, as discussed below, they support the more narrow
proposition that courts have interpreted specific legislative protections of
employees as expressly limiting their application to claimants who are
remunerated for their services or have excluded volunteers for other
reasons tied to the text of the statute being invoked.
Thus,

the

firefighters in

rejection

of sex

City of Calhoun

v.

discrimination

Collins 50

claims

by

volunteer

was not based on the broad

principle that remuneration or significant benefits are required for a person
to be protected by an employment law statute. Rather, the decision was
explained on the grounds that the conduct of the members of the volunteer
group was not under the direction of the government entity being sued,51
that the statutes under which the claims were made are designed to remedy
employment

type

discriminatory

practices

and

not

other

types

of

discrimination,52 and that restoration of membership in a voluntary group is

not the sort of remedy anticipated by anti-discrimination statutes that

protect employees.5

Mendoza

v.

3

Town ofRoss, 54

also cited for the broad proposition that a

volunteer must be remunerated to receive employee protections, denied a
disability discrimination claim by a quadriplegic volunteer whose traffic
assistance and crime watch position had been eliminated.55 That decision
48. Id. at 1 7 1 -73.
[I]n order to determine whether the purported volunteers are employees under employment
discrimination statutes, courts have applied the primary purpose test, the economic reality
test, and the hybrid test. Other courts have focused exclusively on whether the individual in
question received any remuneration and examined what constitutes remuneration.
Additionally, others have adopted a two-step approach requiring that the putative employer
control the work and that the purported volunteer be hired.
/dat 1 7 1 .
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) O F EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1 .02 reporters' notes cmt. b . (citing Tawes v.
Frankfort Volunteer Fire Co., 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 660 (D. Del. 2005); Mendoza v. Town of
Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 452 (Ct. App. 2005); City of Fort Calhoun v. Collins, 500 N.W.2d 822 (Neb.
1 993)).
50. 500 N.W.2d at 825-27.
5 1 . Id. at 827; id. at 828 (Caporale, J, concurring).
52. Id. at 826 (citing Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1 987)).
53. See id. at 826-27.
54. The case is incorrectly cited in the Reporters' Notes. The correct citation is Mendoza v. Town
ofRoss, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 452 (Ct. App. 2005).
55. Id. at 454-55
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turned not on the absence of pay or benefits but rather on the fact that the
claimant never held the volunteer position because he had not been
appointed to it by the town authorities as required by the governing
regulations.56
Finally, in

Tawes

v.

Franliford Volunteer Fire Co. , 57

the trial court

was not addressing a broad proposition respecting the status of volunteers
under employee protective legislation; rather it was focusing on the tests
other courts have used in applying particular statutes protecting workers
from employment discrimination.58 Borrowing, out of context, language
from a Supreme Court decision concerning the responsibility of fishing
boat owners for the captain's and crew's social security and unemployment
insurance tax contributions, the district court adopted as its guiding
proposition that in "the application of social legislation[,] employees are
those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business
to which they render service."59 Based on that proposition, without further
analysis, the district court cited lower court statements that a volunteer who
does

not receive compensation
employment discrimination.60

is

not

protected

by

laws

banning

In contrast, at least in the case of volunteer emergency responders,
several state legislatures (including those of jurisdictions involved in some
of the cases cited in the Reporters' Notes) as well as some state courts, 61

and some federal statutes,62 adopt the principle that volunteers should
receive at

least some

indemnity protections

and

benefits

given to

employees. Similarly, a few state courts, emphasizing the purpose of the
legislation, have provided workers' compensation benefits to volunteer
workers even in the absence of explicit statutory coverage for such
persons.63

56. Id. at 457-58.
57. 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 660 (D. Del. 2005).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing U.S. v. W. M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 1 79, 1 85 (1 970)). The Court in Webb held that
maritime law should govern whether for such purposes the fishing vessel's captain and crew, whose
remuneration was based on defined shares of the value of the catch, should be treated as employees of
the boat's owner. 397 U.S. at 1 89-94. On remand it was held that the owner had an employer's
responsibilities to make payroll deductions. W. M. Webb, Inc. v. U.S., 424 F.2d 1070, 1 07 1 (5th Cir.
1 970).
60. Tawes, 1 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 660.
6 1 . Conflicting case authorities respecting the treatment of emergency responders, and statutory
references, can be found at Acts Outside Regular Duties, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) §
27.03(4)(b) (June 2008).
62. For example, 1 6 U.S.C. § 558c (2000) includes forest service volunteers as employees for
purposes of tort claims, workers' compensation claims, and claims for lost personal property.
63. See, e.g., Matthews v. County of Nassau, 562 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1 990) (county
museum volunteer covered by workers' compensation); Orphan! v. St. Louis State Hosp., 441 S.W.2d
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Comment d - Interns and Student Assistants

This Comment uses the term "intern" without defining it. A possible
definition would be:
An intern is someone whose uncompensated efforts primarily provide

that person with tutelage and experience that are transferable in serving
other persons or entities and do not to a material degree give value to the
source of the tutelage or the source of the opportunity for experience that
is greater than is the value of the intern' s enhanced learning.

This definition would have the virtue of being consistent with the way the
California

legislature

in

its

Higher

Education

Employer-Employee

Relations Act defines when students are to be considered employees rather
than student interns at the University of California. 64 It is consistent, too,
with the draft's apparent effort to distinguish between student work for
purposes of training and student work that substitutes for hiring additional
staff.
Comment d states this last proposition as follows: "[S]tudents who
render uncompensated services to satisfy bona fide education or training
requirements . . . generally are not treated as employees."65 In contrast, the
California courts have granted workers'

compensation protection to

students who, without pay, work "shoulder to shoulder with paid workers .
. . in an established business or institution" and render "services that are of

economic benefit to the third party."66 While there is a division of authority
on this point, other courts have issued similar decisions including requiring

that apprentice wages be paid to students whose intern or extern activities
generate significant value.67 The Reporters' Comments do not adequately
reflect this division of authority nor assess the merits of the competing
approaches.
The Reporters' Notes appear to have a heading missing inasmuch as
they treat issues raised under Comment d in the notes headed "Comment

355 (Mo. 1969) (volunteer dance therapist at mental hospital was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits where the statute defined employee as "every person in the service of any employer, as defined
in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment
or election"); Pruit v. Harker, 43 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1931) (holding an uncompensated child working for
his parent to be an employee within the meaning of Missouri's workers' compensation statute).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562e (West 2009).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 1 .02 cmt. d.
66. Land v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 1 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 432, 435-36 (Ct. App. 2002).
67. See, e.g., Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 271 N.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mich. 1978) (holding
student teacher fulfilling a degree requirement without pay to be an employee for purposes of workers'
compensation in part because defendant school benefited from student teacher's services); Heget v.
Christ Hosp., 58 A.2d 615, 61 6-17 (N.J. Ct. C.P. Hudson County 1948) (holding unremunerated student
nurse fulfilling certificate requirement was employee of defendant hospital for purposes of workers'
compensation because hospital benefited from student nurse's services).
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c." One of those notes addresses the issue of the status of student athletes
and offers as the default rule the assertion that courts find no employment
relationship even in the case of financial aid in exchange for participating
in money-generating athletic programs. 68 Because this issue has not been
extensively litigated, it is misleading to present it as a settled principle.
Thus, the notes cite but two case decisions of questionable persuasiveness
in support of the statement, one of which has been overruled with respect to
what it had characterized as the primary consideration for determining

whether an employment relationship exists.69 Moreover, as discussed
below, this default rule is inconsistent with the approach many courts take
in distinguishing volunteer status from employment status based on the
commercial value of the work efforts and on the monetary and other valued
inducements for participation. Nor does this default rule reflect the
economic realities of the commercialization of certain athletic programs on
many campuses.
The older of the student-athlete cases cited in the Reporters' Notes
emphasized the absence of proof that either side intended to create an
employment relationship, the governing athletic association' s regulations
prohibiting pay for participation, and the required continuation of financial
aid irrespective of the athlete' s contribution to the team ' s success. 70 This
led the court to conclude that the student athlete was "first and foremost a
71
student." However, the court did not discuss factors that may distinguish
the lives of those recruited to campus as athletes from the lives of other
students, including those receiving other types of scholarships, or the
frequency with which student athletes graduate from the particular
institution as contrasted with other recipients of financial aid.
The second case cited in support of the statement that courts find no
employment relationship even where student athletes on scholarship play in
a money-generating sport is a Texas appellate decision that rejected an
athlete' s workers' compensation claim brought in 1991 based on a
2
paralyzing injury he suffered playing college football in 1974. 7 The
court ' s decision emphasized the compensation act's explicit requirement
that there be "a contract of hire" and found that a jury could conclude that
his letter of intent and financial aid agreement did not constitute a contract

68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOY MENT LAW§ 1.02 reporters' notes cmt. c.
69. Id. (citing Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983), overruled by
GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402-03 (Ind. 2001); Waldrep v. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 21
S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App. 2000).
70. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170-73.
71. Id. at 1173.
72. Waldrep, 21 S.W.2d at 692.
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of hire because the NCAA regulations under which the athlete undertook to
play expressly prohibited taking pay in exchange for playing and did not
permit cancellation of the athlete's grant-in-aid based on his athletic ability
or his contribution to the team's success, or in certain circumstances, even
if he quit.73 However, the Texas court cautioned: "Our decision today is
based on facts and circumstances as they existed almost twenty-six years
ago. We express no opinion as to whether our decision would be the same
in an analogous situation arising today; therefore, our opinion should not be
read too broadly."74
Although the Texas court did not explain why it offered its concluding
remark, a caution ignored by the Reporters' Notes, there are ample reasons
to ask whether, at least in those revenue-generating intercollegiate football
and basketball programs that dominate media attention, the players are
integral to the educational program or integral to a financially lucrative
auxiliary activity. Facts relevant to assessing whether the services in
question are obtained in the course of an economic enterprise rather than an
educational program would include comparing the budgets, remuneration
levels, and work expectations of the coaching staff with those of other
institutional departments; examining the integration or separation of the
athletic department's governance system in relation to that of the rest of the
campus; the degree of regimentation of the lives of student-athletes in
comparison with those of other students; and the graduation rates for
"student"-athletes as contrasted with those of other financially aided
students. Thus, the Larson treatise on workers' compensation questions the
relevance in these situations of the parties' "proven intentions" that the
athletes are present as students, not workers, and observes that generally in
workers' compensation cases courts find employment even though the
expressed

intention

of the parties was to establish

contractor

relationship. 75

respecting

lax

Citing

enforcement

or

the

widespread

widespread

an independent

public

disobedience

controversy
of NCAA

regulations, the Larson treatise observes: "[T]here is something faintly
naive about the repeated contention that the claimant could not have been

playing for pay because the NCAA forbids it."76

73. Id. at 702.
74. Id. at 707.
75. Recreational and Social Activities, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 22.04(1)(c)
(June 2007).
76. Id.
An enormous cast of participants harvests a wealth of riches from major college sports.
Universities derive enormous revenues and other indirect, but vital, benefits from successful
athletic programs . . . . The NCAA supports itself entirely by revenues generated from selling
broadcasting rights of its members' games. Many coaches are compensated lavishly for
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The Reporters' Notes acknowledge a competing view to the extent of
offering a "but see" citation to an older Colorado decision that allowed a
workers' compensation claim on behalf of an injured athlete.77 However,
the notes provide an incomplete summary of the case. There the student
athlete had several campus jobs which could have been held by non
students. 78 The Colorado court was quite clear that these university jobs,
which provided him with free lodging, meals, and spending money, were
dependent on his playing football and, therefore, concluded that when the
student was injured during Spring practice, the injury arose out of his
employment.79 The Colorado decision can, of course, be distinguished
from the other two cases based on the absence of an athletic association
regulation preserving the student's in-kind aid and income in the event he
could not play. 80 On the other hand, as previously discussed, an effort to
accurately characterize the nature of the relationship should also look at the
extent to which the athletic program and lives of the athletes were similar
to or different from the rest of the campus.
Given the weakness of the rationale of the cited decisions, the Texas
court's words of caution, and the failure to explore a number of grounds for
finding that the relationship with the school was not primarily academic, it
is inaccurate to present the law in this area as settled. Moreover, this is an
area where, consistent with ALI traditions, the Reporters could offer
guidance to a more progressive path to justice.

4.

Comment e - Volunteers Perform Uncoerced Services

Comment e states: "Coerced individuals are employees if their work

producing successful programs. Media enterprises generate rich advertising revenues by
airing college athletic events. Indeed, college sports constitute a $60 billion industry.
Amy McCormick & Robert McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA 's Veil of
Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496-97 (2008).
77. RESTATEMENT (TIDRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .02 reporters' notes cmt. c (citing Univ. of
Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1 953)).
78. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 424 (athletes were paid monthly, other students were paid hourly).
79. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 426.
80. See id. Shortly after the Colorado court decided Nemeth, it rejected the workers' compensation
claim of another college football player who died from a playing injury. In a decision not included in
the Reporters' Notes, State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 3 14 P.2d 288 (Colo 1 957), the
court explained that unlike the earlier case, the evidence did not show that the athlete would not have
attended the school absent the grant-in-aid provided by the football team. Also, his campus jobs and
tuition scholarship were available to students who did not participate in athletic programs. Thus, the
court found he primarily was on campus as a student, a finding that may have been further influenced
by the fact that the school for which the decedent played, Fort Lewis A & M College, did not have the
type of program that demanded widespread media attention or generated significant revenue. The fact
that the school carried accident insurance for its football players, additionally may have persuaded the
court that the school and athlete had accepted an alternative method of protecting the athlete's interests.
Id. at 289-90.
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serves the interests of an employer who consents to receive their
services." 81 This statement is followed by the observation that "This may
not be the case for prisoners who are forced to do work in a prison for
purposes of punishment or rehabilitation rather than to serve the interests of

an employer." 82 While the phrasing of that sentence is pregnant with the
opportunity to find that under various circumstances inmate workers have
employment protections, it is narrowed by the Reporters' Notes which
state: "Presumably the purposes of employment laws do not extend to work

done under a prison's control pursuant to a penal sentence." 83 Neither the
notes nor comment offer a rationale for this rule and, therefore, the Draft
provides no guidance regarding the resolution of this difficult issue.
Potentially

affected

by

the

stated

exclusion

of

prison

work

from

employment protections are the roughly 2.3 million persons incarcerated in
the U.S. 84 As explained below, courts are in need of thoughtful guidance
respecting this area of the law of work. Thus, the lack of such guidance in
the Draft is a significant gap in the document.

One category of prison labor is prison housework.85 It involves

maintaining the facility or meeting the needs of other inmates through jobs
such as cooking, baking, laundering, dishwashing, grounds keeping,
carpentry, painting, and nursing assistance. Because such work is otherwise
performed by hired civilian workers, the terms and conditions of prison
housework has a significant market impact as well as an impact on the
conditions of incarceration. The other category of prison labor is work in
prison industries.86 Such work involves producing products or services sold
by the prison system; work that otherwise would be performed by free
labor. Indeed, was it not for the comparative severity of U.S. prison

sentences, 87 a significant portion of those who are incarcerated would be

active participants in the free labor market. Therefore, because prisons
generally require medically able inmates to work, the terms and conditions
of such employment has a significant competitive impact on portions of the

labor market including the market for prison staff. 88

8 1 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 1 .02 cmt. e.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1 .02 reporters notes cmt. e.
84. 0EP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUMMARY FINDINGS (2007), at
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm>.
85. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension ofEmployment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 870 (2008).
86. See id. at 869.
87. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME
AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981-96, at 30 (1 998), available at
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjusew96. pdt>.
88. It has been estimated that "well over 600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates are

2009]
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Most prison inmates perform some prison housework and a
significant portion work in prison industries that produce goods or services
sold to government agencies89 or private consumers. For example, in 2002
it was reported that the Federal Prison Industries, operated by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, employed approximately 23,000 inmates out of a total
of 157,000 prisoners and that about 65,000 inmates were employed in state
operated prison industries.90 Although only a small portion of prisoners
currently are estimated to do contract work for the private sector, there is
reason to expect this number to grow.91
A recent study by Professor Noah Zatz found that since the mid 1980s,
federal courts have acknowledged that with respect to some labor
protective statutes such as the FLSA, prison workers employed by private
contractors fulfill the definition of "employee" where they perform that
work outside the prison prernises.92 It has also been held that work-release

prisoners are employees who may participate in an NLRB election.93 These
decisions turn not on any finding that prisoners inherently can or cannot be
employees but rather on the purpose of the particular statute.
On the other hand,

courts

generally

deny relief for

inmates

employed by prison industries or in prison housework either because such
assignments are presumed to be an aspect of penal rehabilitation (an
assumption most often made with little or no attention to the functional
realities), because such activity is not an economic relationship, or because
the government defendant enjoys sovereign immunity from monetary
liability.94 This leaves an inmate-worker in a significantly less protected
situation than someone performing identical work in a non-inmate capacity.
For example, under general tort law, absent intentional infliction of injury
or deliberate indifference to prisoner safety, courts do not require prisons to
compensate their prisoner-employees for work-related injuries. 95 Thus, if
working full time in jails and prisons throughout the United States." Zatz, supra note 85, at 868.
89. The Federal Prison Industries Act provides for the sale of such goods to government agencies.
18 U.S.C. § 4 1 22 (2000).
90. ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY REPORT, PRISON LABOR:
IT'S MORE THAN BREAKING ROCKS 1 (2002), available at <http://www.ppionline.org/documents/
prison_labor_502.pdf>.
9 1 . A Forbes.com article estimated the number at 6000 nationally. Maureen Farrell, Putting
Prisoners To Work (Aug. 19, 2008), <http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/1 8/prison-small-business-ent
manage-cx_mf_08 1 8prisonlabor.html>. This estimate appears to not include work performed by those
incarcerated in privately operated prisons. Such prisons, which have been growing in number, hold
over 6.7 percent of the total prison population. See Rachel Antonuccio, Comment, Prisons for Profit:
Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CORP. L. 577, 582 (2008).
92. Zatz, supra note 85, at 875-78, 893-95.
93. Speedrack Prods. Group v. NLRB, 1 14 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1 997).
94. Zatz, supra note 85, at nn.1 0 1-04.
95. Colleen Dougherty, Comment: The Cruel and Unusual Irony of Prisoner Work Related
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an oven were to explode in a prison kitchen permanently injuring a non
inmate baker and an inmate baker' s helper, only the former would be
eligible for disability benefits. 96
The decisions respecting the FLSA' s application to prison labor
largely ignore history' s lessons respecting the social as well as economic
realities of the role prison labor can and has played in using inmates as a
cheap alternative source for a work force to perform particularly onerous
tasks, like road gangs and swamp drainage; a role that perverts the
corrective and rehabilitative functions of incarceration and undermines the
employee welfare goals of labor protective legislation. 97 In addition, as
Professor Zatz observes, penological goals are probably better served by
granting prison labor the same status as other workers. 98 Thus, careful
analysis of the status of inmate labor that gives greater attention to the
history of abuse of such labor and the potential rehabilitative role of prison
work could lead to the conclusion that the goals of labor protective laws
and the penological process are better served when courts include prisoners
within those laws.
Although the Department of Labor and some judicial decisions point
to prisoner dependency as a justification for excluding them from the
FLSA, the Department of Labor has rej ected such a justification with
respect to patient-workers, such as those in mental institutions. Rather, its
regulations grant employment protections to patients who perform work

within the institution if it "is of any consequential economic benefit to the
institution." 99 The inconsistency of excluding internal prison labor from the
FLSA while giving such protection to confined patients deserves at least
some mention in a document designed to guide courts to improved justice.
In contrast with judicially shaped decisions respecting minimum
wages and tort liability, twelve states plus the federal government provide

some workers ' compensation benefits to prisoners injured in the course of
doing assigned duties other than personal housekeeping.

'00

Over forty

Injuries in the United States, 1 0 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 483, 484-85 (2008).
96. At the same time, if the explosion was caused by the negligence of a well-healed inmate
maintenance worker who was serving time for tax fraud, the non-inmate baker and the inmate helper
might be eligible for a substantial tort recovery against the negligent inmate depending on the
jurisdiction's approach to the fellow-servant doctrine and co-worker immunity. See, e.g., Buckley v.
New York, 437 N.E.2d 1088 ( 1982). Five jurisdictions do not extend workers' compensation immunity
to co-workers and limit the scope of that immunity. Who are "Third Persons ": Types of Statutes, 6
LARSON ' S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) §§ 1 1 1 .02(1), 1 1 1 .03(1) (June 2008).
97. Zatz, supra note 85, at 886-96.
98. /d. at 908, 9 1 0, 932.
99. 29 CFR § 525.4 (2008).
1 00. Necessity for "Contract ofHire ", 3 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 64.03(6) (June
2008).
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years ago the Council of State Governments recommended such a
reform.

101

A governmental advantage to this approach is that it provides a

shield against potentially more generous tort liability for such injuries .

102

Normative protective standards respecting prison labor have been
proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) which adopts
conventions intended to ensure social justice and humane treatment of
workers. The ILO ' s Forced Labour Convention of 1 930 prohibits all forced
labor, but at Article

2,

paragraph

2(c),

excludes from the definition of

prohibited forced or compelled labor
any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is
carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and
that the said person is not hired to or �laced at the disposal of private
1
individuals, companies or associations. 3

The original Convention's seeming rejection of all private contracting
of prison labor was modified in the
Experts on the Application

2007 Report of the ILO' s Committee of
104 That
of Conventions and Recommendations.

document addressed the issue of when prison labor for a non government
entity is permitted regardless of whether the non-government entity is an
employer that brings its work into the prison, whether the prisoners are
released to work outside the prison, or whether work is performed for a
privately operated prison.
principles,

105

The

in such situations

2007

Report asserts that, under ILO

the prison labor must be

subject to

government supervision and control that is effective, systematic, and
regular, including oversight by those government officers who normally
inspect working conditions. In addition, prison labor for nongovernment
entities must be voluntary, as evidenced by a written statement of consent,
and the prisoner must not be subjected to pressure or the prospect of any
penalty, such as loss of a right or privilege, for refusing the opportunity to
engage in such work or having the refusal taken into account in deciding

1 0 1 . Id. (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 23 (1 963)).
1 02. See, e.g., Drake v. Essex County Corr. Ctr., 469 A.2d 5 1 2 (N.J. Super. 1983) (holding that
action of injured prisoner under Tort Claims Act is possible because workers' compensation benefits
unavailable to prisoner).
1 03. International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention Concerning Forced Labour Art. 2, ILO
C29 (May I , 1 932), available at < http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl .htrn > (scroll down to
C29 and click) (emphasis added).
1 04. ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (articles
19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution), Report Ill (Part lB): General Survey Concerning the Forced Labor
Convention, 1 930 (No. 29), and the Abolition ofForced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 96th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. ILC96-III(I B)-2007-02-0014-1-En, available at <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/
---ed_norrn/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_089 l 99 .pdt>.
105. Id. at 24-27.
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106

Finally, the ILO Guidelines call for such labor to be performed under
conditions

that

approximate

a

free

labor

relationship

including

a

comparable level of wages (allowing for reasonable deductions for the cost
of housing and food and taking into account differences in productivity and
costs of training and supervision), social security benefits, and the
occupational health and safety protections afforded free workers.

107

If a

Restatement were to guide federal and state courts based on such
international norms, its analysis of statutory protections might more readily
recognize the appropriateness of extending to prison inmates statutory
worker safety and health protective regimes, as well as minimum wage
benefits.
V. SECTION

1 .03

A. Text of the Provision and Critique
Section 1.03 Owners Are Not Employees For Purposes of Laws
Governing Employment Relationship

Unless otherwise provided by law, for purposes of laws
governing protections, benefits, . and obligations in the
employment relationship, an individual is not an employee of an
enterprise if the individual through an ownership interest
controls all or a significant part of the enterprise.
This section is concerned with situations in which employees have
ownership interests in the entity in which they are employed. Strangely, the
stated black letter rule focuses on the individual' s ownership attributes as
contrasted with the employment attributes. Nevertheless, it is the latter that
is the focus of the core authorities that guide judicial interpretation of
statutory protections, benefits, and obligations of employment. Therefore, it
is puzzling why the focus of a draft

Restatement (Third) of Employment

is

on ownership attributes rather than upon employment attributes.
The impact of employee ownership interests on employee protective
legislation was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc. ,

where

the

Goldberg v.

Court upheld FLSA

regulations prohibiting home manufacture of goods made by members of a
producer cooperative.

1 06. Id. at 24-3 1 .
107. Id. at 30-3 1 .
108. 366 U.S. 28 ( 1 961).

108

The Court reached this result because it found that
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those performing the work were vulnerable to employee risks and
explained:
There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a
proprietary and an employment relationship. If members of a trade union
bought stock in their corporate employer, they would not cease to be
employees within the conception of this Act. For the corporation would
"suffer or permit" them to work whether or not they owned one share of
stock or none or many. We fail to see why a member of a cooperative
109
may not also be an employee of the cooperative.

Instead of looking to the ownership characteristics of the co-op
members, the Court examined the economic realities of their work efforts
and observed:
The members are not self-employed; nor are they independent, selling
their products on the market for whatever price they can command. They
are regimented under one organization, manufacturing what the
organization desires and receiving the compensation the organization
dictates. Apart from formal differences, they are engaged in the same
work they would be doing whatever the outlet for their products. The
management fixes the piece rates at which they work; the management
can expel them for substandard work or for failure to obey the
regulations. The management, in other words, can hire or fire the
110
homeworkers.

Accordingly, the black letter rule should examine the individual' s attributes
as an employee. Moreover, as explained below, including in a leading case
cited by the Reporters, courts have found ownership control to be irrelevant
to an individual ' s rights under some employment statutes .

B. Comments on Section
1.

1.03 -

Critique

Comment a - Overview

Comment a asserts that as a general matter employment protections
and obligations do not apply to employees who through their ownership
interest control their own remuneration and activities on behalf of the
1
enterprise. 1 1 This test is inconsistent with the black letter rule stated in
section

1 .03

which recites the test as whether "the individual through an

ownership interest controls all or a significant part of the enterprise." 1 12 For
example, partners control their own remuneration and activities on behalf
of the enterprise if they individually attract their own clients or patients,

1 09.
1 10.
1 1 1.
1 12.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .03 cmt. a.
Id. § 1 .03.
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exercise professional prerogatives in providing counsel or treatment, and
retain a share of the resulting fees - the Comment a test for not including
an individual as an employee. Nevertheless, that individual may have little
or no control over such core enterprise decisions as the purchase or
disposal of property, the hiring or dismissal of professional and support
staff,

the

expansion

or

contraction

of

the

enterprise ' s

areas

of

specialization, the location or amenities of its facilities, the schedule of fees
for services, and the like - factors that are essential to applying the test
recited in the black letter rule stated in section

1 .03.

When courts and counsel reference an adopted ALI Restatement
principle, often they do not go beyond the black letter assertion. Therefore,
the rule itself should accurately reflect any critical qualifications. In this
instance

the

Reporters

have

presented

two

conceptually

different

approaches to resolving the question of whether an individual is primarily
an owner or an employee. Therefore, the first step in accomplishing its task
under section

1 .03

will be for the Reporters to decide whether the guidance

should be based on the black letter rule stated in section

1 .03

or the tests

described in Comment a. On the other hand, as discussed below, neither of
those tests accurately reflects either a prevailing approach or an approach
best suited to carry out legislative goals. Accordingly, both the black letter
rule and the Comment a approach should be reconsidered.
The Reporters' Notes for this Comment indicate that the Supreme

Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates P. C. v. Wells 1 1 3
source for the stated section 1 .03 test of whether ownership

Court decision in
is the primary

status defeats treating an individual as an employee for purposes of
employee protective legislation.

1 14

In

Clackamas,

the issue was whether a

professional corporation' s shareholder should be included in determining if
the enterprise had the threshold number of employees needed to trigger its
coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Clackamas

1 15

The

Court expressly rejected a proposed test that the question to be

answered was whether the

shareholder-director appeared to be the

functional equivalent of a partner.

1 16

Rather than focus on the institutional

role of the person in question, the Court looked to the extent to which the
individual had the characteristics of an employee who is dependent on the
entrepreneurial decisions of others.

1 17

In approaching its task, the Court

declared that with respect to terms such as "employee,"
1 13.
1 14.
1 1 5.
1 1 6.
1 1 7.

538 U.S. 440 (2003).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .03 reporters' notes cmt. a.
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 441 .
Id. at 446.
Id. at 448.
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congressional silence often reflects an expectation that courts will look to
the common law to fill gaps in statutory text, particularly when an
undefined term has a settled meaning at common law. Congress has
overridden judicial decisions that went beyond the common law in an
118
effort to correct "the mischief' at which a statute was aimed.

Putting aside that statement' s ambiguity regarding the default rule for

construing federal legislation, 1 1 9 the Court announced that the common law
should be the guide in identifying who is an employee under the ADA and

called for the fact finder on remand to weigh six factors (with no one factor
2
2
being decisive 1 0 and with other factors possibly being relevant as well 1 1 )
to determine if the shareholder should be counted as an employee.
Although the Comment a test of whether the individuals in question control
their own remuneration and activities on behalf of the enterprise is relevant
to several of the six factors listed by the Court, the Comment a test does not
reach other factors the Court listed as matters to be weighed such as:
whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, the extent to which
the individual is able to influence the organization, and whether the
22
individual shares in the organization's profits, losses and liabilities. 1
Moreover, as the Reporters ' Notes to Comment c reveal, there is a
lack of consistency in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to construing
who is a covered employee when that term is undefined in a federal statute.
Thus, while the

Clackamas

decision says that "the mischief at which the

legislation is aimed" is not a factor to be considered in construing who is an
2
employee, 1 3 a year later in Yates v. Hendon, the Court relied on "textual
clues" to find guidance concerning the legislature' s intent respecting the
24
scope of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ' s protections. 1
As a result, without consulting a common law test of employment, it
2
treated a working owner as a protected pension plan participant. 1 5
If the Reporters have concluded that a particular default rule is best

I 18. Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 3 1 8, 324-25
(1 992)).
I I9. As discussed irifYa, the Court often has found that a statute reflects a legislative expectation
that some other test or tests will be used in determining whether one is an employee.
1 20. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 45 1 .
1 2 1 . Id. at 450 n. 1 0.
1 22. Id. at 440.
123. Id. at 447.
124. 541 U.S. I , 12 (2004).
1 25. In Clackamas the Court did not examine either the textual clues respecting the scope of what
Congress sought to do when it adopted the ADA or any clues in the Act's legislative history respecting
the purpose of the fifteen employee threshold. 538 U.S. at 440. Had it done so, it may have been
persuaded to use a test that reaches more broadly in counting employees inasmuch as the Act contains
such textual statements of purpose as "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" 42 U .S.C. § 12 I 01 (b)(1 ) (2000).
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suited to doing justice, they have neither identified that rule with clarity nor
offered a fully explicated doctrinal analysis and defense of their choice.
Furthermore, to the extent the Comment finds any support in the

Clackamas

decision, it is important to note that the Supreme Court was

applying its rule for construing federal legislation. Thus,

Clackamas

does

not control the rule to be applied when interpreting a state statute, and state
courts, as discussed below under Comment c, are apt to give weight to the
legislative goal of extending social welfare benefits to all workers who are
vulnerable to economic misfortunes or abuses of managerial control. The
proffered black letter rule stated in section

1 .03,

however, does not reveal

this competing approach to construing such legislation.

2.

Comment c - Statutory Variation

Comment c references a number of situations in which the black letter
rule stated in section

1 .03

does not reflect the approach courts have adopted

in construing employee-related legislation and the Reporters' Notes cite
some state case decisions respecting the availability of owner-worker
claims under workers' compensation legislation. However, because there is
no discussion or analysis of the doctrinal grounds for these variations, the
stated rule and Comments provide no real guidance in assessing the
wisdom of selecting a particular approach. Moreover, so as to not mislead,
the black letter rule itself should reflect that it is not a consensus standard.
In addition, Comment c and the Reporters' Notes fail to observe that
state courts have adopted alternative default rules in construing who is an
employee protected by other categories of statutory or common law claims
for relief. As the guardians of the common law, state courts can, as
previously observed,

determine that the common law definition of

employee goes beyond the Supreme Court' s

Clackamas

approach and that

the default rule should include giving weight to the mischief that is being
remedied. Thus, even where state courts seek guidance from federal

judicial approaches to construing statutes, often they append their own
perceptions respecting the best approach to carrying out legislative intent.
For example, in Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Associates, 126
while taking guidance from
in

Clackamas the

Clackamas,

the New Jersey court observed that

Supreme Court "did not require its own six particularized

prongs to be the sole standards; and opened the door to consideration of all
2
factors relevant to power and control." 1 7 The New Jersey court,

126. 901 A.2d 322 (N.J. 2006).
127. Id. at 247.
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accordingly, applied its own default definition of employment by taking
principal guidance from the statute' s goals, explaining:
Given [the statute] ' s broad remedial purpose of protecting workers
whose whistle-blowing is of benefit to the health, safety and welfare of
the public, in applying the fourth Clackamas factor courts should ask
whether, because of a shareholder-director' s inability to influence an
organization, he or she is "within the class of people that the statute was
128
designed to protect."

The broad range of common law tests of employment used by state courts,
as well as alternative tests adopted by federal courts, is discussed more
fully under section

1 .04, below.

The Reporters' Notes to Comment c reference the Supreme Court's

NLRB

v.

Bell Aerospace Co.

decision.

129

That decision, however, said

nothing about when a worker-owner is precluded from employee status
under legislation that provides employee protections or obligations.

Aerospace

Bell

did not examine the question of what should be the default

definition of employment in construing federal statutes; rather, the Court
examined the Labor Management Relations Act's legislative history to
discern Congress' intent respecting the class of employees protected by that
Act

and

concluded

that

employees

who

exercise

core

managerial

responsibilities are not among those employees Congress intended to
protect. Therefore,

no guidance respecting the

subject of section

Bell Aerospace offers
1 .03. Similarly irrelevant is

Comment e ' s reference to the

explicit FLSA exclusion of bona fide executive, administrative, and
professional employees from federal minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements, 1 30 because these exclusions have nothing to do with
ownership or control but, rather, define the legislature' s perception of
which employees need the protection of minimum and premium pay
legislation.
The Reporters ' Notes correctly observe that the NLRB has treated the
collective authority of employee-shareholders who have "effective voice in
the formulation and determination of corporate policy," as removing them
from the NLRA's protections. This proposition, however, is far from
settled. The result was reached by a three member NLRB panel and has
128. Id. at 248; see also D' Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 1 13 (N.J. 2007) (holding that
when deciding if someone is protected as an employee under the state whistleblower statute, the core
question is whether that person's work is integral to the employer's business interests). In D 'A nnunzio,
the court stated that when dealing with specialized work, questions to be examined are: "Is the work
continuous and required for the employer's business? Is the professional regularly at the employer's
disposal? Is the professional required to perform routine or administrative activities? If so, an employer
employee relationship more likely has been established." Id. at 1 14.
129. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
1 30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 77.06(c), (d), (e) (2000).
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been questioned by one Board member who observed that the rule has
never been fully explored. 131 Moreover, while there is doctrinal support for
this approach in representation proceedings, based on the proposition that
employee-shareholders who collectively wield such authority are managers
and, as such, are not eligible to elect a certified bargaining
1
representative, 32 it is inconsistent with the doctrine that the exercise of
individual, as contrasted with collective, rights under the NLRA cannot be
waived by the collective. 133 If the collective cannot waive individual
NLRA rights, then the potential authority of the collective employee
shareholders to have an effective voice in corporate policy should be
irrelevant to an individual shareholder-employee who asserts an individual
statutory claim for relief. Thus, this portion of the Reporters ' Notes should
be deleted so as to not enshrine the dubious proposition that worker
shareholders who have a voice in corporate affairs thereby lose their
protections under section

7

of the NLRA.
VI. SECTION

1.04

A. Text ofProvision and Critique
Section 1.04 Employees of Two or More Employers at the Same
Time

An individual is an employee of two or more employers if the
employee and each of the employers meet the conditions of an
employment relationship set forth in § 1.01 either
(a) through the employee's service to each employer in separate
courses of conduct, or
(b) through the employee's service to each employer in one
course of conduct.
On its face, this section incorporates the black letter rule stated in
section

1 .01

as the basis for determining whether there is an employment

relationship. However, as seen below, the Comments to section
an approach that is more limiting than that stated in section

1 .04 state
1 .01 and that

has been adopted by many courts. In addition, as discussed below, the

1 3 1 . Citywide Corp. Transp., 338 N.L.R.B. 444, 445 (2002) (Liebman, concurring). Member
Liebman further noted that any restriction based on the worker-shareholders' collective authority to
effectively shape management policy should be limited to those situations in which the employee
shareholders are not only heard but can also modify terms and conditions of employment in face of
divergent interests of other shareholders or managers who have entrenched positions of power. Id. at
445-46.
1 32. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
133. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 4 1 5 U.S. 322 ( 1974).
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Reporters' description o f the test for applying the proposed black letter rule
stated in section

1.04 is marked by inconsistency and lack of clarity.

Furthermore, different policy considerations apply to the question of
whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor, the subject
of section

1 .0 1 , than apply

to the question of which of a group of possible

employers stand in an employment relationship to a worker, the subject of
section

1 .04.

In the first instance, independent contractors are (at least in

theory) able to protect themselves. In contrast, where the issue is whether
particular parties are responsible for providing employee protections or
obligations, a misguided rule may leave the employee, as an economically
disadvantaged person, with no protections. For example, someone who is
not an employee might lack any redress against an entity' s racial, gender,
religious, age, or disability discrimination. To implement the legislature' s
goal o f protecting weaker parties and ensuring that market decisions are
based on merit, not prejudice, courts should reach for a broad definition of
employment

unless

the

legislation

specifies

otherwise

or

provides

alternative avenues for carrying out its goals under such circumstances. The
same is true with respect to whether a worker is within or beyond a welfare
insurance plan such as unemployment or workers ' compensation.
In some situations the issue is not whether the worker will receive any
protection but rather which scheme of protection applies. For example, if a
worker was tortiously injured and all possible employers are governed by
the same statutory scheme, the employment decision controls whether a tort
or an insurance benefit will be available and which employer or employers
must pay for the remedy, at least in the first instance. In the long run,
according to market theory, the actual cost often is passed along to
employees collectively in the form of lower remuneration. On the other
hand,

if an injury was due to a worker' s own carelessness or to

unforeseeable or unpreventable cause, differences in employee protection
schemes

1 34

may leave the victim without any benefit or with substantially

reduced benefits depending on the resolution of the question of which
employer or employers are proper respondents. Thus, the underlying (and
not always enunciated) policy focus respecting the ability to bear and
spread the risks, and availability of alternative remedial structures, do not
lead to identical results in all multi-employer situations - a consideration
not reflected in the Reporters' analysis or pronouncements respecting the
correct

tests

of

employment.

Accordingly,

the

separate

policy

considerations respecting the multiple employer issue justify tests of

1 34. An example would be the contrast between the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § §
5 1 -60 (2000) and Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 3 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2000).
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employment status that are more inclusive than those adopted in section

1.01

and the policy considerations for allocating legal responsibilities

among possible employers, the subject of section

1.04,

may differ

depending on the nature of the particular protections or obligations.

B. Comments on Section
1.

1.04 -

Critique

Comment a - Overview

Comment a asserts that persons working for more than one employer
most often do so in different time slots or periods.

1 35

Is there an empirical

basis for that statement? Additionally, what is its significance, even if
accurate, and what is the difference between "time slots" and "periods"?
The Reporters' Notes for Comment a speak of protecting

employees." 1 3 6

"servants

or

How does a servant differ from an employee? What is the

justification for resorting to the outmoded term "servant"?

2.

Comment b - Working for Two or More Employers through Separate
Courses of Conduct
Comment b again refers to time slots and shifts. What is the difference

and what is the empirical basis or significance for the assertion that it is
rarer for workers to provide services to more than one employer during a
general time period than to provide them at separate times? Crane
operators, security guards, goods transfer handlers, and traffic monitors at
construction sites and transportation hubs and terminals probably are more
common examples of providers of such services than the ones offered.

3.

Comment c - Working for Two or More Employers through a Single
Course of Conduct
Comment c includes tests of whether there is an employment

relationship. In addition to referencing section

1 .01,

Comment c treats as

settled law the contention that
performance, plus

actual control over the manner and means of
actual control over payment of the worker, are the

criteria for determining the employment law responsibilities of lenders and

borrowers of employee services. 1 3 7 The statement does not explain what
result follows if but one of those two factors is present.

In contrast, the last sentence in the same paragraph of Comment c is
1 35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.04 cmt. a.
136. Id. reporters' notes cmt. a (emphasis added).
1 37. Id. cmt. c, at 53 (emphasis added).
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inconsistent with this statement. The last sentence asserts that the test of an
employment relationship is whether the user has the

power to

direct work

or set compensation. 1 3 8 That is, the first statement looks to actual exercise
of authority whereas the last sentence describes formal authority.
As with the first statement, it is unclear whether under the test stated
in the last sentence there must be the power to control both work
performance and pay. A possible implicit resolution of this conflict is
presented by Illustration

4

to Comment c which says that employer

responsibility is established based either on power to control compensation
or on power to control work performance. 1 39 However, that does not clarify
the previously noted discrepancies in Comment c, respecting authority to
control as contrasted with actual control.
Adding to the confusion, Illustration

6

to Comment c explains its

result in terms of factors beyond those of control of compensation or work
performance (for example, the lending employer' s dependence on the
4
assignments received from the borrower) 1 0 even though the former are the
sole factors listed in Comment c.
Putting aside for a moment Comment e ' s lack of consistency, it uses
a very narrow test of employer responsibility in borrowed employee
situations - a test that focuses only on performance and compensation
control. Although the text of the black letter rule stated in section
explicitly references the definition of employment set forth in section
the criteria in Comment c to section

1 .01

1 .04

1.04
1.0 1 ,

are inconsistent with the section

criteria for distinguishing employment from independent contractor

status.
Section

1.01

distinguishes contractor independence from employment

on the basis of authority over the various aspects of the relationship
including the source of instrumentalities and tools, the duration of the
relationship, the method of payment, the location of the work, and the
ability to retain assistants.

Control over the means and method of

performance is just one factor to be weighed and is not of itself
determinative. Unlike the section
Comment c to section

1.04,

1.01

approach, the test (or tests) in

by using much more limited criteria of

employment, readily allows for evasion of employer responsibilities
imposed by the legislature. Thus, in this age of marginalized and contingent
workers, telecommuting, and reliance on employee innovation, creativity,
and professional discretion, the section

1 38. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. cmt. c illus. 4.
140. Id. illus. 6.

1.01

standard would generally
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result in including more workers as employees than would the tests set out
4
in Comment c. 1 1 Comment e ' s limitation of the scope of employment
status in borrowed employee situations, therefore, violates the principle of
doctrinal consistency because it offers no justification for the use of
different tests under these companion provisions. In addition, because
justice requires that doubts be resolved in favor of inclusion when
construing employee protective statutes, especially in situations in which a
worker may be left without any protection or benefits, the greater flexibility
and inclusiveness of section

1 .01

is a more appropriate approach for courts

to follow than the narrow criteria proposed by Comment c. On the other
hand, as previously discussed, differences could be justified if section
provided a broader definition of employment than is found in section
because, as discussed above and below, the section

1 .01 definition
1 .04.

1 .04
1 .01

itself is

probably too narrow for the issues addressed by section

A further problem with Comment c is that the legal standard for
allocating joint or separate employer responsibility in borrowed employee
situations is far from settled; many court decisions conflict with the
performance control and payment rules as stated in either of the ways in
which they are presented in Comment c. That is not to say that the factors
listed in Comment c are irrelevant to resolving this issue. Courts often
emphasize them. However, courts sometimes ignore them and often go
beyond them.
When

weighing

the

significance

of

a

court's

discussion

of

performance control where more than one purported principal is present,
one should recognize that if the party the worker seeks to hold responsible
as an employer, or the party that seeks to claim the immunities available as
employer, exercises total control over the details of work performance, a
finding of employer status based on evidence of performance control might
obviate the need to explore other factors for imposing responsibility or
immunities on a recipient of work efforts. Thus, when a court decision
focuses on control of work performance or payment in finding employment
status, it does not necessarily rule out other factors that might establish
employment in the absence of such control.
To the extent that the Comment c rule is governed by the actual
control test, it conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court' s decision in Kelley v.

Southern Pacific Co. ,

in which the Court held that, for purposes of the

1 4 1 . See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 53, 1 58-60 (2003);
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 25 1 , 279-80
(2006).
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Federal Employers' Liability Act, a party will be an employer of a
borrowed employee if it

either controls or has the right to control the
4
employee's physical conduct. 1 2 More importantly, the Court in Kelley did

not attempt to adopt the "either controls or has the right to control" test as a
general rule for defining employee status and it has used other criteria
14
when enforcing other federal statutes. 3
Although the "either controls or has the right to control" test was
adopted in the

in a provision designed to

ascertain

that test represents neither

Restatement, (Third) of Agency
respondeat superior responsibility, 144

settled law nor sound policy for dealing with employee protective statutes.
Moreover, the comments to that provision describe operative facts that go
beyond mere questions of performance control in determining whether a
4
principal is an employer in borrowed employee situations. 1 5 These include
the duration of the worker' s presence in the workplace and the source of
14
training and of tools needed to perform the work. 6 Thus, even for

respondeat superior purposes,

the latest Restatement ofAgency allows for a

more expanded notion of employment than is presented in Comment c.
While the Supreme Court' s decision in

Kelley

recited a test of

employment that focuses only on control of a worker' s physical conduct, it
was dealing with a situation in which that means of identifying the
worker' s employer did not leave the worker unprotected or without
4
benefits. 1 7 Rather, Kelley' s injury was covered at the least by state
4
workers' compensation benefits. 1 8 Nevertheless, he was seeking additional
4
tort recovery under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). 1 9 That
50
1
statute, which applies to railroad workers
(and, through the Jones Act, to
1
1
5
seafarers ) almost always offers an avenue of added benefits for
employees seeking remedies for their injury or illness. Even if an FELA
suit is barred by the failure to prove employment or the failure to prove the
requisite fault, the injured worker will almost always be able to recover a
state workers' compensation benefit or a compensation benefit under the
generally more generous Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation

1 42.
143.
1 44.
145.
146.
1 47.
148.
149.
1 50.
151.

4 1 9 U.S. 3 1 8, 3 3 1 -32 ( 1974).
Id. at 324-32.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
Id. cmt. d(2).
Id.
Kelley, 4 1 9 U.S. at 332.
Id. at 321 .
Id. at 322.
45 u.s.c. §§ 5 1 -60 (2000).
46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2000).
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Act, 1 52 or under mandatory railway worker disability insurance, 1 53 or under
the maritime doctrine of maintenance and cure. 1 54 Additionally, a seafarer
whose PELA recovery is blocked by inability to prove employment status
with the vessel may still have a tort type remedy under the maritime
doctrine of unseaworthiness. 1 55 Accordingly, the relatively narrow
employment status lines drawn by the Supreme Court for PELA (broader,
nevertheless, than those that are recommended by Comment c) do not pose
a serious risk of leaving employees without protection.
It is not surprising, then, that when determining the scope of
employment responsibilities under the much broader reaching PLSA, the
Supreme Court has taken a more flexible approach. That approach goes
well beyond the common law's traditional focus on control of work
activities, using instead an economic reality test that looks to such factors
as the source of the opportunity to work, the payment for the work, and the
1
regimentation of the work product. 56 As a result of this broader approach
to employee status, if work is performed on the borrower' s premises by

employees of a lender that has no other customers, and the work is integral
to the borrower' s operations, the borrower is jointly liable for any PLSA
pay deficiencies. 1 57
In like regard, in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 1 5 8 the appellate
court held that when determining whether a party is an employer for
purposes of PLSA responsibilities it must consider the economic realities
and weigh the permanence or duration of the working relationship and the
extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer' s business.
Although the

Zheng decision is cited in the Reporters'

Notes to support two

illustrative examples used in the Comments respecting the element of
payment as evidence of employment, the Reporters overlook the decision' s
significance in supporting a test of employment that goes well beyond the
narrow elements listed in Comment c.
Numerous other decisions have observed that determination of
employment status under the PLSA requires examination of the totality of
the

circumstances

to

ascertain

whether

the

putative

employee

is

1 52. 33 u.s.c. §§ 903-50 (2000).
153. See 45 U.S.C. § 352 (providing for pay for temporary disabilities under the mandatory
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act)
1 54. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 1 58 (1903) (although a vessel is not liable to a seaman for negligence
resulting in personal injury, the seaman is entitled to recover for his maintenance and cure).
155. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960).
1 56. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961).
1 57. Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., Inc., 495 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (analyzing
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1 947)).
1 58. 355 F.3d 6 1 , 67 (2d Cir. 2003).
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economically dependent on the alleged employer. Hence, in

Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman,

Baystate

the court ruled that under the FLSA

the absence of direct, on-site supervision does not preclude a determination
that a lending ehtity shares with the borrower the status of employer of
temporary workers. 1 5 9 Like the Zheng decision, this case is cited in the
Reporters' Notes to support two illustrative examples respecting the
element of payment as evidence of employment. Again, the Reporters
overlook the decision' s greater significance in supporting a test of
employment that is broader and more flexible than the narrow elements
listed in Comment c.
Similarly, the Reporters ' Notes portray Antenor

v. D

&

S Farms 160

as

a decision using the test of the employer' s power to control the work and
effectively determine compensation. However, the court's opinion set forth
eight factors to be weighed including the right, directly or indirectly, to
hire, fire, or modify employment conditions; the ownership of the facilities
where the work occurs; whether the work is integral to the enterprise; and
the parties' respective investments in equipment and facilities. 1 6 1 Further,
the court in

Antenor

explained that no one factor is determinative; rather

the employment relationship depends on the economic reality of all the
circumstances, and that ultimately it must be determined whether the
workers are economically dependent on the lender and borrower of their
labor. 1 62
The Reporters' Notes also offer a misleading account of Moreau

France, 1 63

v. Air

which decided that under the Family and Medical Leave Act an

airline was not a joint employer of employees of contractors that provided
ramp and towing services, baggage handling, and food preparation. The

·

1 59. 163 F.3d 668 (!st Cir. 1998); see also Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730 (determination
of the employment relationship depends on the circumstances of the whole activity).
1 60. 88 F.3d 925 (I Ith Cir. 1 996).
1 6 1 . Id. at 932.
162. Id. The same observation regarding the Reporters' failure to acknowledge broader tests used in
cases they cite is applicable to Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (I Ith Cir. 1 994) where the
court explained:
To determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists for purposes of federal
welfare legislation, we look not to the common law definitions of those terms (for instance, to
tests measuring the amount of control an ostensible employer exercised over a putative
employee), but rather to the 'economic reality' of all the circumstances concerning whether
the putative employee is economically dependent upon the alleged employer."
Id. at 439; accord Torres-Lopez v. May, l l l F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1 997). In Torres-Lopez, also cited by
the Reporters, the court found joint employer responsibility, relying on such factors unrelated to
performance or payment control as the ownership interest in the premises and equipment, the amount of
investment in equipment and materials, the ability to shift activities from one source of income to
another, the opportunity for profit or loss depending upon managerial skill, and the extent to which the
work effort was an integral part of the business of the user of the workers' services. Id. at 639-41 .
1 63. 343 F.3d l l79 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Reporters ' Notes assert that the court "stressed that Air France did not
share in the control of the means and manner of work or the compensation
of the servers." Although those factors had been stressed in the district
court decision, the appellate court criticized that focus as "a bit narrow in
64
the circumstances of this case," 1
and affirmed the district court' s
conclusion only after weighing numerous other relevant factors including:
use of shared premises with the ground handling companies, a provider' s
temporary subleasing o f space from the airline, an arrangement giving the
airline a small office area in a provider' s facility, the premises where most
work was performed, the source of capital investment in most of the
equipment used in providing the services, the ability to shift business
operations to serving other entities, the performance of such services for
other entities, the source of employee opportunities for promotion, and the
6
extent to which the work was integral to the respective businesses. 1 5
Department of Labor regulations under the FMLA also reflect a broad
understanding of the employment relationship (not fully revealed by the
Reporters' Notes referencing the regulations in Comment e) and include
situations in which an employee performs work that simultaneously
benefits two or more employers and situations in which one employer acts
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the
66
employee. 1 Pointedly, the DOL regulations specify that determination of
joint employment "is not determined by the application of any single
16
criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be viewed in its totality." 7
Moreover, the regulation establishes a presumption of joint employment
when a temporary or leasing agency supplies employees to a second
6
employer. 1 8
Nor, as previously indicated, have the federal courts followed the
Supreme Court's relatively narrow

Kelley

approach when applying other

federal employee-protective statutes that regulate benefits for work injuries.
6
For example, in Brown v. Union Oil Co., 1 9 in determining whether the
defendant was the injured worker' s employer under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, and therefore immune from tort
liability, the court of appeals applied a nine factor test, and control of
performance was only one element. As is so often recited, the court held

1 64.
165.
166.
1 67.
1 68.
1 69.

Id. at 1 190.
Id. at 1 190-9 1 .
2 9 CFR § 825.106 (2008).
Id. § 825 . 106(b)(I ).
Id.
984 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
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that "no single factor, or combination of them, is determinative." 1 70 Other
factors included whether the employee acquiesced in the new arrangement,
whether there was a continuing relationship with the lender employer, the
duration of the borrowing arrangement, and who could dismiss the
employee. 1 7 1 The authority to set the compensation (a determinative factor
according to Illustration

4)

is not among those listed by the appellate court.

It should be noted that distinguishing the Longshore and Harbor Workers '
Compensation Act from the PELA is the fact that those covered by the
Compensation Act, such as self-injured overseas employees of defense
contractors, may not have any other recourse if they are deemed to not be
employed by one of the joint employers. Hence, the legislative purpose of
this welfare benefit law justifies a broad, flexible approach to ascertaining
whether a claimant is within the protected class.
The federal Occupational S afety and Health Act (OSHA) requires an
employer to furnish "employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards . . . likely to cause serious physical
harm to his employees." 1 72 Despite over three decades of disputes
respecting

the

application

of that language

to

borrowed

employee

situations, OSHA law on the issue is not fully settled. Nevertheless, the
leading

treatise

in

the

field

states,

"In

determining

liability,

the

Commission and the courts have rejected the common law concept . . . , but
have focused on business reality and the purposes of the Act." 1 73
Accordingly,

several

circuits

hold

that

a

borrower

employer

has

responsibility under the Act if it has knowledge of a violation of OSHA
regulations and the ability to abate it regardless of its control over workers
who are exposed to the hazard. 1 74
There also are numerous state court decisions arising in a variety of
common law and statutory contexts that reject the rule stated in the second
and third sentences of Comment c. For example, Alabama courts hold that
the employer in borrowed employee situations is the party that has the
reserved right to control the employee, not the party that actually exercises
control. Power over compensation is not part of that court' s quite narrow
and inflexible approach. 1 75

1 70. Id. at 676.
1 7 1 . Id.; accord Guillory v. Gukutu, 534 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.R.!. 2008).
1 72. 29 u .s.c. § 65 1 (2000).
1 73. MARK ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 163 (1 998).
1 74. MICA Corp. v. OSHRC, 295 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Universal Constr. Co. v.
OSHRC, 1 82 F.3d 726 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999); U.S. v. Pitt.-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 1999).
1 75. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., Civil Action 06-0803-WS-B, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 8 1 6 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2008).
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The default position for deciding whether a borrowing employer has

respondeat superior

responsibility for the borrowed employee ' s negligent

acts under North Carolina law calls for the fact finder to weigh, among
other things: the nature of the work to be performed, which employer
supplies the instrumentalities used to perform the work, the nature of those
instrumentalities, the duration of the employment, whether the temporary
employer has the skill or knowledge to control the manner in which the
work is performed, and whether the temporary employer in fact exercises
performance control. 1 76 Further, absent evidence to the contrary, the North
Carolina rule presumes that the lending employer retains the right of

control. 1 77 Additionally, in North Carolina a party that benefits from work
that it knows or should have known was either ultra-hazardous or
inherently dangerous, is liable for the worker' s injuries resulting from that

hazard even though it did not control work performance. 1 78

In South Carolina the definition of employment looks to four
factors: the right or exercise of control, furnishing of equipment, right to
dismiss, and method of payment. 1 79 California courts have ruled that
factors to be weighed in finding whether the state workers' compensation
statute immunizes the lending employer from a tort suit by an injured
employee

include:

the

duration

of the

lending arrangement,

which

employer' s payroll listed the loaned employee · at the time of the injury,
which employer had the authority to dismiss the loaned employee, and the
degree of discretion available to the loaned employee in performing the
assignment. 1 80
The Indiana bench holds that to determine if an employer-employee
relationship exists with respect to a loaned worker under its workers'
compensation act, the fact finder should weigh: whether the purported
employer has authority to dismiss the worker, the mode of payment, who
supplies tools or equipment, who controls the method of work assignment

and performance, and the duration of employment. 181 The Indiana court
further explains that this is a balancing test in which the right to exercise
2

control over the employee should receive the greatest weight. 18

176. Pettiford v. City of Greensboro, 556 F. Supp. 2d 5 1 2, 536 (M.D. N.C. 2008). Similar criteria
have been attributed to application of the New York workers' compensation law. Campos v. I. Grace
Co. New England, LLC, No. 06-Civ. 2466 (RWS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87393 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 27,
2007); see also ilifra note 1 83 and accompanying text.
1 77. Pettiford, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 5 1 2.
1 78. Kinsey v. Spann, 533 S.E.2d 487, 490 (N.C. 2000)
1 79. Nelson v. Yellow Cab Co., 564 S.E.2d 1 1 0, 1 1 2- 1 3 (S.C. 2002).
1 80. Marsh v. Tilley Steel Co., 606 P.2d 355 (Cal. 1 980).
1 8 1 . Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind. 1 99 1 ).
1 82. GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind. 2001).
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And, in New York it has been held that where a worker has dual
responsibilities

it

is

enough

to

hold

a

party

liable

for

workers'

compensation benefits if it created a web of relationships to receive the
benefits of the worker' s services even though that party did not pay the
worker but had authority to remove him from the status that provided his
1
income such as by excluding the individual from the work premises. 83
As previously explained, on several occasions the Reporters' Notes
cite for other purposes decisions that use a far broader definition of
employment, but they ignore the teaching of those decisions respecting
employment in borrowed or dual employer situations. Additional examples
of this include

NLRB

v.

Town

&

Country Elec., Inc.,

where, when

reviewing whether a paid union organizer can simultaneously be an
employee of an enterprise whose workers he is trying to organize, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that the meaning of "employee" under the NLRA is
not based on the narrow traditional common law of agency definition of
employee but instead takes guidance from "the breadth of the ordinary
4

dictionary definition." 18

Similarly, the Reporters ' Notes cite Dunkin ' Donuts Mid-Atlantic
1 85 in support of the proposition that
v. NLRB,

Distribution Center, Inc.

workers can be employed jointly by multiple employers, but the discussion
overlooks the significance of the appellate court' s observation in that case
that employment status was correctly established based on varying levels of
involvement in decisions relating to hiring, discipline, assignment of work
18
and equipment, compensation levels, and recognition and awards. 6 The
Reporters' Notes also cite another case for the same proposition respecting
the possibility of joint employment, but ignore the significance of the fact
that employment status with the entity that assigned part time workers to
the one for whom they performed services was based on the former entity's
maintenance of the referral roster, issuance of the workers' paychecks, and
control over their rate of pay and other benefits 187 - factors that Comment c

183. Palmer v. State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate Med. Univ., 787 N.Y.S.2d 489 (App. Div.), appeal
denied, 842 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 2005).
1 84. 5 1 6 U.S. 85, 90 ( 1 995). Although finding that the NLRB's discretion in such cases is not
confined by common law concepts, the Court did examine the facts in light of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency and found no conflict between the NLRB's finding and the Restatement rules respecting
employee status. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 cmt. a, at 499 (1957).
1 85 . 363 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
1 86. See id. at 440-41 .
1 87. NLRB v. W. Temp. Servs., Inc., 82 1 F.2d 1258, 1 266-67 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 33 1 U.S. 722 (1947); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d (2d Cir.
2003); Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668 ( ! st Cir. 1 998); NLRB v. Browning
Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1 1 1 7 (3d Cir. 1 982) (joint employment where multiple entities share or co
determine key matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment).
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adopts in part but not in their entirety.
The concluding sentence in the paragraph in which the Reporters '
Notes discuss these and similar cases reads: "As an employer may have
responsibility under the NLRA to bargain collectively over any subject that
may control, the power to control test fits well the purposes of this
88
statute." 1
In addition to being an inaccurate reflection of the NLRB ' s
approach to such cases and an incomplete and unclear description o f the
duty to bargain, this statement does not reveal the significance of the
breadth of bargaining subjects, which includes numerous issues unrelated
to work performance or pay. Nor does it give proper weight to the
feasibility of joint employer bargaining as evidenced by the long history of
multi-employer bargaining in the U.S. and in other free market economies.
Thus, if the duty to bargain helps define who is an employee under the
NLRA, the breadth of the duty to bargain should justify weighing factors
far beyond the two control elements recited in Comment c.
The Reporters '

Notes also inaccurately assert that employment

discrimination cases involving questions of joint employment "generally
8
have applied the same functional test" as is used under the FLSA 1 9 - a test
the Reporters' Notes, as explained above, mischaracterize as relying on
control of performance and pay. 1 90 McMullin v. Ashcroft, 1 9 1 the most recent
of the cited decisions, arose under the Americans With Disabilities and the

Rehabilitation Acts. 1 92 There the breadth of the court' s analysis, as in so
many other cases, went beyond performance control and payment. Rather,

the court more broadly asked whether one or both entities exercised
significant control over the essential terms and conditions of the worker' s
employment and sought its answer by looking at such factors a s their co
determination of the worker' s initial and continuing qualifications for the
position, their respective roles in selecting the worker, their respective
abilities to remove the worker and shape job responsibilities, and
1
identifying which party equipped the worker. 93
In contrast to the statement in the Reporters ' Notes respecting the test
for an employment relationship in discrimination cases, the Eleventh
Circuit in

Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs. ,

a Title VII case, looked not to

FLSA decisions but to NLRB cases, stating that the question of fact to be

1 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .04 reporters notes, at 58.
1 89. Id. at 59.
1 90. The cases cited in the Notes in support of this statement are all district court decisions. Id.
1 9 1 . 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D. Wyo. 2004).
1 92. Which Act applied depended on whether the employer was the supplier or user of the worker's
services.
1 93. McMullin, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1 294, 1297.
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resolved is whether the alleged employer has sufficient control of the terms
4
and conditions of employment. 1 9
The terms and conditions of
employment,

of course, cover numerous aspects of the relationship

unrelated to control of compensation or work performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the extent to which a Restatement is intended to provide a clear,
accurate statement respecting existing "majority" or consensus rules,
sections

1.02, 1.03,

and

1 .04

do not achieve that goal. Majority or

consensus rules have not been accurately identified and largely do not exist
with respect to the subjects of these three sections. In addition, the stated
black letter rules lack completeness and precision, in some cases are
contradicted by the reiteration of those rules in the Comments, seldom are
explicated with supportive doctrinal or empirical analysis, and the few parts
where analysis is offered it is far from exhaustive. Moreover, the
Reporters' Notes have numerous incorrect or misleading representations of
case decisions and other authorities.
Restatements, even when accurate and clear ought to do more than
summarize consensus rules and settled doctrinal explanations.

Law Reports, American Jurisprudence

and

Corpus Juris

American

already do that

and do so in a way that is regularly updated. So do the more concise (and
thereby generally less useful) treatises. Based on the traditional role of
Restatements, judges,

scholars,

and practitioners look to ALI work

products for something more. They are sources for furthering the process of
synthesizing and refining the common law so as to better fulfill the goals of
justice.
One aspect of promoting justice is to hold people and legal entities to
that conduct which the community expects of them - enforcement of the
community' s normative expectations. However, a problem in applying that
approach is that as communities become larger and more complex, it is
more difficult to identify accurately a single set of normative expectations
for the employment relationship. Also, owners, managers, workers, and
judges do not necessarily share expectations respecting the fair allocation
of employment rights and obligations. In addition, as enterprises expand
into diverse communities, the participants' understanding of normative
behavior can be expected both to change and to vary. Those expanded,
diverse communities often extend beyond national boundaries and a not
insignificant portion of that part of our workforce most often targeted by

1 94. 30 F .3d 1 350 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 994).
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protective legislation has at least one foot in cultures that are not part of
mainstream America. Therefore, it is appropriate to seek guidance from
sources that reflect external and global normative standards. There should
be nothing startling in this proposition. Such American legal classics as the

Federalist Papers

and early Supreme Court decisions reveal that American

jurists and scholars working in an age when this nation had little else
besides the common law regularly sought guidance from French, German,
and Roman legal sources as well as from British and other authorities.
Additionally, as technology changes, so too are there important
changes in the normative expectations. For example, discovering who is an
employee by examining the extent of control over performance is less and
less relevant when workers are hired to innovate, to create, or to
telecommute

from their homes.

One neglected

source

of guidance

respecting such changes can be found in the trends of legislative reform.
However, the Comments and Reporters' Notes accompanying sections

1 .02, 1 .03,

and

1 .04

do not reveal an effort to seek guidance from this

source or from other sources to gain a broader understanding of the
normative expectations of the employment relationship in the changing
work environment.
Further, as the best common law jurists from Coke to Cardozo have
shown, the common law should be more than simply a reflection of
normative expectations. Those who apply the law should not lose sight of
the goals of justice - protect the weak from exploitation by the strong,
ensure

honest

dealings,

adjust

legal

relationships

based

on

neutral

considerations, distribute burdens to those who can carry them with the
least pain (often by redistributing them to a broader community), and place
risks on the shoulders of those best able to minimize the threatened harm.
In those parts of the text examined above, the rules, comments, and notes
do not reveal an effort to improve our system of justice either by analyzing
the impact of the proposed rules or by seeking guidance beyond the
confines of our own institutions.
Several years ago, Professor Guy Davidov offered a carefully
explicated analysis of the contemporary concept of employment in a
variety of advanced economies (including the U.S.) with an eye to best
implement legislative regimes for employee protections and obligations.
Building upon a draft guideline being developed by the ILO, he offered and
justified

an

approach

determinative. 1

95

that

weighs

ten

factors,

with

none

being

These are:

1 95. Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers
in Need ofProtection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 402-09 (2002).
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(1) The extent to which the user enterprise determines when and how
work should be performed, including working time and other conditions of
work of the worker;
(2) the extent of supervisory authority and control of the user
enterprise over the worker with respect to the work performed, including
disciplinary authority;

(3)

the extent to which the user enterprise makes investments and

provides tools, materials and machinery, among other things, to perform
the work concerned;
(4) whether the worker has the ability to spread her risks-among
different clients, different suppliers, or others;

(5) whether the work is performed on a regular and continuous basis;
(6) whether the worker works for a single user enterprise;
(7) the extent to which the work performed is integrated into the
organizational or bureaucratic control of the user enterprise;

(8)

whether the user enterprise provides substantial job-specific

training to the worker;

(9) whether the worker is

free to refuse work; and

(10) whether the worker can send substitutes to do the work.
Rather than subjugating employment law to the agency tests of vicarious
liability, when correcting and revising their draft for Chapter 1, the
Reporters ought to reconsider the tests offered in sections 1.02, 1.03, and
1.04 in iight of Professor Davidov' s thoughtful recommendations.
Finally, the Chapter is incomplete in its coverage. There are contexts
in which law has a need to define the boundaries and characteristics of
employment relations that go beyond those explored in Chapter 1. For
example, employees are guests at the place where they perform their work.
Are or should the definitions of the relationship that drive vicarious liability
rules and trespass rules for employees be similar to or the same as those
that drive rules respecting responsibilities toward other categories of
guests? What about bailments? Is one a gratuitous bailee and the other a
commercial bailee? If so, which is which? Are the employee' s tools or
other personal property deserving of the same or different protection by the
principal than are those of an independent contractor? As another example,
the issue of apparent authority is, in a sense, the contractual equivalent of
vicarious liability. Should the same rules apply for finding apparent
authority to make a contractual undertaking as apply for finding vicarious
liability? Should the guidelines respecting apparent authority be the same
for a worker with respect to dealings with low level supervisors and same
level co-workers as they are for third parties? Based on a key-word search
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it does not appear that the drafters have examined any of

these questions.
There are other common law questions that arise out of employment
relations that do not seem to have been considered in defining employment,
though, perhaps they are covered elsewhere in the total document including
the parts yet to be written. Copyright law makes certain presumptions
based on employee status, including common law exceptions based on
employment as a teacher. Key-word searching the chapter shows a couple
of parenthetical references to cases citing the federal copyright statute but
no analysis respecting the appropriateness or inappropriateness of treating
or not treating someone as an employee for purposes of copyright but not
for other purposes. Similarly, the common law shop right claim to equitable
use of a patent is based on employee status. Should that status be defined in
the same manner for this purpose as for the purpose of determining
vicarious liability or determining coverage under employee protective
legislation? Addressing these questions

is a necessary part of any

restatement of the law governing the employment relationship.

